This article offers an interpretation of the problems addressed by and the eventual purpose of the United States government. Simultaneously, it seeks to analyze and explain the continued three-part structure of the United States federal government as outlined in the Constitution. Subsequently I define the three parts of the federal government-judiciary, executive, and legislative-as explained through the lens of the Platonic paradigm of (logos = word = law), (thymos = external driving spirit = executive), and (eros = general welfare = legislative) extrapolated from Plato's dialogues.
INTRODUCTION † Charles Edward Andrew Lincoln, IV, ("Charlie") received his J.D. from Texas A&M University in May 2016 after graduating, cum laude, with a Bachelor's Degree in Government from Harvard University, in June 2013. Throughout his College and Law School years, Charlie has been fascinated by the intersection of philosophy and power in politics. He has written on Hegelian Dialectic in the evolution of U.S. Constitutional Law as well as Platonic influences in the U.S. Constitution, both of which have been accepted for publication. In September 2016, Charlie began the advanced LL.M. program in International Tax Law at the University of Amsterdam, for which he plans to write a thesis on the transfer pricing and valuation of intangibles. Charlie hopes to work in International Cooperation and Policy Development, and may be reached at charlesedwardandrewlincolniv@post.harvard.edu This paper argues that the tripartite system of government in the United States can be viewed through the Platonic concept of the soul (ψυχή). 1 The major premise is that the United States federal government has three major parts-the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative. The minor premise of this paper is that the Platonic soul is divided into three parts-the logos (λογιστικόν), 2 the thumos (θυμοειδές), 3 and the eros (ἐπιθυμητικόν). 4 The syllogism and argument of this paper is that the three federal parts of government represent the Platonic soul: the judiciary being the logos, the executive being the thumos, and the legislative being the eros. This paper will explore these concepts in greater depth. As a corollary, when the soul of the polity 5 becomes unbalanced, then people become dissatisfied with the government because government does not fulfill its function administratively-as in acting in opposition to the laws-and in promoting justice. However, sometimes overstepping a role in the Platonic soul of the polity is necessary change.
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases.
A. Why a Structured Approach at All? An Anthropological-Philosophical Explanation
To understand why it is appropriate to analyze and compare the U.S. government with the Platonic concept of the soul, it is helpful to have some understanding of the context of philosophical-anthropological thought related to it. The following paragraph is a brief overview of relevant historical analysis to provide context related to structural and "trifunctionalist" analysis. Indeed, many anthropological-philosophical theories exist for understanding the basic structures of societies and governments, from Claude Lévi-Strauss's structuralism theories, 12 to Michel Foucault on the impetus behind government function, 13 to Marvin Harris on gift giving incentives in a society's structure.
14 Concurrently, the idea of a "tripartite" structure of society being inherent to human cultures is not new, but it has been written about extensively by George S. Dumezil 15 and has been addressed gravity in terms of the electrical force between two protons is ten to the fortieth times weaker! Also, ten to the fortieth to the one-fourth, or ten to the tenth, just about equals the number of stars in a galaxy, the number of galaxies in the universe, and the inverse of the weakfine structure constant! JOHN UPDIKE, ROGER'S VERSION 23-24 (1986); GEORGE JOHNSON, A FIRE IN THE MIND: SCIENCE, FAITH, AND THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 308-16 (1996) . Robert Birmingham, Proving Miracles and the First Amendment, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, n.60 (1996) . 12 "To illustrate the nature of structuralist theory, this discussion will concentrate on the work of Claude LeviStrauss. Levi-Strauss has made the search for the fundamental properties of human thought the focus of his work. His basic objective is uncovering the universal, basic structure of human thought, which is deep below the surface but is manfested [sic] in myth, language, cooking, table manners, and the general structures of social life. This basic structure, which is termed 'deep structure,' will identify cross-cultural similarities." Donald H. J. Hermann, Phenomenology, Structuralism, Hermeneutics, and Legal Study: Applications of Contemporary Continental Thought to Legal Phenomena, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 379, 390-91. (1982) . 13 In an article, Jinks explains: Michel Foucault's compelling and poetic methodological manifesto describes the nature of 'critique' and, thereby, the proper role of the critic. For Foucault, 'critique' was more than a means to an end; criticism was itself an act of resistance and refusal. by Sigmund Freud's division of psychoanalysis. 16 Indicative of the universal nature of the "trifunctionalist," Dumezilian approach has even been applied to PreColumbian Yucatán Mayan societies. 17 Poetically, in the Homeric Greek account of the Judgment of Paris-prior to the beginning of the Trojan War in Homer's Iliad-Paris of Troy is given a Dumezilian "choice"-a beauty contest among three goddesses: Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite. 18 It seems fitting to apply the Ancient Greek concept of the Platonic Soul to governmental structure because the "trifunctionalist" approach has origins in Ancient Greece, but it can also be seen in non-western civilizations.
A balanced view of government may exist in the separation of powers as Montesquieu laid out: "that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals."
19 Exploring this thought "[i]n The Federalist No. 47, Madison explained that while Montesquieu was correct in saying that the separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers was essential to liberty, that conclusion did not purport to tell us how strict the resultant separation had to be." 20 Based on their education, the framers of the Constitution may have even had Plato's Soul in mind when they framed the Constitution. 21 Even if the framers did not have Plato on their mind, the idea of Plato's Soul is arguably inherent in humans regardless of how it is defined. 22 Moreover, a structured approach to the philosophical underpinnings to a government can be assumed to have been in the framer's mind -whether consciously or subconsciously. 
B. Why Plato? Truth and Justice in Plato
If one accepts the premise that structured and philosophical approaches are a reasonable mode of analysis, then why should one use Plato's approach specifically?
This idea of comparing the Platonic soul to the United States federal system of government has previously been written about by Akiba Covitz in The Soul of the Polity. 23 Covitz argued the syllogism as judiciary is the thumos, the executive is the logos, and the legislative is the eros. This paper greatly appreciates and gains much inspiration from Covitz's theory, but switches correspondences from thumos to logos for judiciary, logos to thumos for executive, and maintains Covitz's conception of legislative as eros. However, Covitz uses a different terminology of 1) artifice, 2) nature, and 3) history/divinity/myth in lieu of logos, eros, and thumos, respectively. 24 Covitz argues that the constitution had a psychoanalytic dimension, and these Platonic elements, in large part, represented this psychoanalysis. regularly employs expressions and portrays views which are derived from Plato (Plato 1986, vii) . '" 30 Covitz lays out the great appeal to using Plato's work: "Put more simply, Plato has provided for the West a fertile image, founded on a complex theory of psychology and politics, of how the soul is seen as working and how it is intimately connected with politics and constitutions." 31 However, Covitz admits there is a darker -more tyrannical and dictatorial -side to Plato's works. Specifically, "according to [Karl] Popper, Plato's Republic is the handbook of tyranny and the guide to constructing a society closed to all change and freedom. Plato's use of lies, myths, and the powers of divinity as aspects of constitutional life, are indicative for Popper of Plato's falsity and duplicity (see Popper 1945) ." 32 This is a relevant argument because despite the appeal of Plato's work for positive ideas, there has also been a more evil side to the works supporting fascism and Nazism.
However, if one is to understand the beginning of the US Constitution, one must be familiar with not only the circumstances that gave its birthbut also the great books that the authors of the Constitution read. Covitz supports this by writing "if one is to search out the theoretical beginnings of American constitutional thought, one must come to grips with the textual beginnings of the Western constitutional thought in which the American experience is itself framed."
33 This can be interpreted as the books and laws with which the framers were most familiar, "regardless of our views of Plato's tyrannical or democratic qualities. Important, underlying aspects of this broader realm of Western constitutional thought began in the dialogic pages and the constitutional theory of Plato's Republic." 34
Truth and Plato's Forms
Indeed, it must be mentioned that Plato's soul has a special connection to truth and Plato's "Forms" in his philosophy, as explained by Kenji Yoshino. 35 Unlike "the poet [who] always misrepresents the truth," Yoshino claims, "[i]n the Republic, Plato describes the existence of immutable, abstract, and invisible Forms." 36 Yoshino states that " [t] hese Forms are the ideals to which Plato seeks to anchor the state and the human soul, which is the microcosm of the state. The highest Platonic aspiration for human beings is to bring us closer to these Forms. The difficulty is that our ordinary modes of perception-such as our sensescannot seize these ideas." However, Yoshino interestingly writes, "Only right reason, as exercised through dialectic, can do so in any systematic way." Plato's -and Professor Yoshino's -intersection of truth, as represented by the forms and justice compels one to look further into why the two are related. Professor Yoshino's formulation of "right reason," 38 sounds akin to the concept of natural law. Natural law exists in religion and higher ethics, which may or may not exhibit themselves in statutes and case law. Natural can be defined as that which is not positive law, but it can also be defined as follows: "Natural law refers to the ethic of justice, fairness, or right. Although denominated 'law,' it is not positive law at all, but rather is a sense derived from God-given or rational sources."
39 Such a definition emphasizes the importance of religion as a base for natural law. However, it can also be based in rational reason or right reason as Professor Yoshino or St. Thomas Aquinas would argue. 40 This means natural law can come from secular sources, and an atheist could believe in natural law through right reason or rational sources.
An all-encompassing definition of natural law would not only contrast itself with positive law but would rather show how it, "relates to positive law by serving as a standard against which positive law can be judged. Natural law is frequently cited as the 'ought' and positive law as the 'is,' meaning that natural law is what should be done and positive law is what exists as the rule established by the sovereign." However, Professor Nonet, discusses the essence of positive law in relation to Nietzsche's philosophy:
What is positive law? We may begin with the familiar account that the word "positive" suggests immediately: positive law (Nietzsche calls it Gesetz) is law that exists by virtue of being posited (gesetzt), laid down and set firmly, by a will empowered so to will. Such
Justice and Plato
In regards to the Platonic Soul, a person acts justly if the soul acts in concordance with each constituent part without overstepping its reach. A person acts unjustly if the soul acts in an unbalanced manner. 43 Likewise, an unbalanced soul may follow any means necessary in Machiavellian fashion to reach a desirable goal. 44 Choosing between what is viewed as natural law and positive law can depend on the balance of the soul. 45 Indeed, in Sophocles' play Antigone, the eponymous character suffered such a choice between following positive law or natural law when deciding to follow the edicts of King Creon not to bury her brother or her religious beliefs to bury her brother. 46 Perhaps this choice between natural law 47 and positive law 48 -also phrased as choosing between what is "right" and following the law-is one of the fundamental cruxes of jurisprudence. 49 An informed viewpoint on the Platonic conception of the soul can help analyze choices between positive and natural law, understand the structure of the Constitution, and explain why former choices had been made and why some decisions in the Supreme Court and Congress are made the way that they are.
Truth, Justice, and Plato
Thus, Plato intimately intertwines truth and justice. The Platonic formseternal ideals-represent truth. 50 Concurrently, justice represents human activity carrying out and adhering to the truth of the forms. However, how can human law "exists" in the sense that it has validity (Geltung). It has validity if the will (Wille) from which it issues has the power (Macht) to impose it, to demand and secure obedience to its command. By 1256 Henry de Bracton wrote of the importance of using past precedent he experienced previously to decide current cases before him, as indicated by his saying, "'(i)f any new and unusual matters arise, which have not before been seen in the realm, if like matters arise let them be decided by like since the decision is a good one for proceeding a similibus ad similia.'" Healy, supra, at 56-57. 52 Tennessee-admits, "Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." 54 Moreover, regarding policy, Rehnquist writes, "[a]dhering to precedent 'is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right.'" 55 However, he claims "when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, 'this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent."" 56 In other words, "Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it 'is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.'" 57 Justice Rehnquist further indicates that the claim that stare decisis is a principle of policy is "particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such cases 'correction through legislative action is practically impossible.'" 58 Rehnquist's opinion on stare decisis has been affirmed and restated in several Supreme Court opinions, recently in Johnson v. United States, where Justice Scalia's majority opinion stated that "[t]he doctrine of stare decisis allows us to revisit an earlier decision where experience with its application reveals that it is unworkable," showing how experience can inform application of stare decisis.
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At first, this move away from purely logical toward using "experience" may seem like a contradiction of the purely logical aspect of the logos in the Platonic soul. Indeed, this is not akin to the elegantia juris using pure logic in law as envisioned by the Romans. 60 we might call him a Hegelian in disguise, so entirely is he interested in the formal connection of things, or logic, as distinguished from the feelings which make the content of logic, and which have actually shaped the substance of the law." 63 Indeed this mode of realism could come into action in judicial decisions specifically with "sociological jurisprudence"-proposed by Roscoe Poundwhereby courts could consider social factors in decision making. 64 Furthermore, Holmes wrote that even decisions that appear to be based on firm logical deductions are actually decisions of policy, stating that "[p]erhaps one of the reasons why judges do not like to discuss questions of policy, or to put a decision in terms upon their views as law-makers, is that the moment you leave the path of merely logical deduction you lose the illusion of certainty which makes legal reasoning seem like mathematics." 65 He declared, however, that choosing the premises, being the choice of policy then using logical deductions from there, for "certainty is only an illusion, nevertheless." 67 The case rose as a result of the steel strikes during the Truman Administration during the Korean War when President Truman sought to take executive control over the steel producers under the inherent powers doctrine. 68 Writing for the majority opinion, Justice Black stated the Presidential and Executive power "must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself." 69 The Court's majority opinion stated that the Court could not "with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities." Holmes continued a sentence later,
[t]he form of continuity has been kept up by reasonings [sic] purporting to reduce every thing to a logical sequence; but that form is nothing but the evening dress which the newcomer puts on to make itself presentable according to conventional requirements. The important phenomenon is the man underneath it, not the coat; the justice and reasonableness of a decision, not its consistency with previously held views… As a branch of anthropology, law is an object of science; the theory of legislation is a scientific study; but the effort to reduce the concrete details of an existing system to the merely logical consequences of simple postulates is always in danger of becoming unscientific, and of leading to a misapprehension of the nature of the problem and the data. 68 Id. at 582-585. 69 Id. at 585. 70 Id. at 587. that he is to be a lawmaker." 71 This means that the Constitution limits the Executive's rulemaking force. Instead, the Court continues interpreting the Constitution so as to give power to the legislature to make rules: "'All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .' After granting many powers to the Congress, Article I goes on to provide that Congress may 'make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.'" 72 Finally-perhaps in an originalist interpretation fashion-the Court declared that "[t]he Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times. It would do no good to recall the historical events, the fears of power and the hopes for freedom that lay behind their choice. Such a review would but confirm our holding that this seizure order cannot stand." 73 As a result of the case, in the concurring opinion Justice Frankfurter wrote " [l] oose and irresponsible use of adjectives colors all nonlegal and much legal discussion of presidential powers. "Inherent" powers, "implied" powers, "incidental" powers, "plenary" powers, "war" powers and "emergency" powers are used, often interchangeably and without fixed or ascertainable meanings." 74 Discussing the Separation of Powers in his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter, quoting Justice Brandeis, stated,
[t]he doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy. 75 In relation to the thumos, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. represents how the Executive branch is limited in its functions of making laws but it carries out these laws. The Executive may resolve conflicts through agencies, specifically through the Chevron deference doctrine, whereby the Supreme Court decided that "considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations." Congress enacted certain requirements applicable to States that had not achieved the national air quality standards established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pursuant to earlier legislation." 78 He continued stating that, "[t]he amended Clean Air Act required these 'nonattainment' States to establish a permit program regulating 'new or modified major stationary sources' of air pollution." Furthermore, the EPA required that plants comply with a certain level of conditions. 80 The issue of the case was "whether EPA's decision to allow States to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as though they were encased within a single "bubble" is based on a reasonable construction of the statutory term "stationary source.'" 81 The Court reasoned that when reviewing an agency's construction of a statute, it must ask two questions. 82 The first question is "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." 83 The second question arises if "Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue…the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute," meaning the court defers to an agency's interpretation. 84 Concurrently, if the agency does not have an interpretation, the court would interpret the statute. 85 The Court reasoned and "justified this new general rule of deference by positing that Congress has implicitly delegated interpretive authority to all agencies charged with enforcing federal law." 86 Indeed, the "the decision [made] administrative actors the primary interpreters of federal statutes and relegate courts to the largely inert role of enforcing unambiguous statutory terms."
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The Legislative
Given the example of the Eighteenth Amendment, Congress passed a law representing a will of portions of the country to prohibit alcohol. But as the Twentyfirst Amendment shows, the Eighteenth Amendment did not accurately represent what people desired. In a sense, the Eighteenth Amendment represented the soul of the polity losing control. This was initially an unjust result, although deemed just at the time, and so Congress repealed it, deciding that the Twenty-first Amendment was just, and the Eighteenth, consequently, was deemed unjust.
The need for rules of statutory interpretation indicates the necessity of interpreting complex laws. 88 This could result from many factors, such a quick drafting or political maneuvering to gain votes. 89 Professor Gluck has pointed out that much of the public outcry against the courts and the legislature exists because we do not have a clear idea of what they should be doing:
These moves have been grounded in a spectacular lack of theory about the role that courts should play in the legislative process itself-which is, after all, the fundamental constitutional question of the Court-Congress relationship in statutory cases. Should courts try to understand how 80 Id. 81 Id. 82 Id. at 843. 83 Id. at 842-43. 84 Id. at 843. 85 Congress works, or is Congress too complex to understand? Should courts be "tough" on Congress, perhaps to incentivize Congress to draft better the next time, or should courts cut Congress some slack, and even correct enacted imperfections? Perhaps courts are best conceived as guardians of the U.S. Code, obligated to shape increasingly imperfect statutes into a more coherent product for the public, no matter how disconnected that result may be from Congress's own intentions. The Court has long resisted definitively answering these basic questions, even as the most difficult statutory cases turn on them. 90 Indeed, the problem with the legislature or courts not conforming to its theoretical role within the three branches of government has occurred in other branches as well, including the judiciary with the Supreme Court. Even "[t]he Warren Court understood the problems and the promises of politics from its own experience. The Court numbered among its members former senators, representatives, and state legislators, a former governor and a former mayor, and former cabinet members." 91 Moreover, there does not seem to be a uniform system of interpreting statutes, despite its importance in courts upholding the rules. 92 Consequently, some argue for adopting a uniform system of statutory interpretation. 93 Indeed, there could be problems with using different types of statutory analysis within courts because one method may work in one case but not another, yet the subsequent courts would be urged to use precedent from the former case. 94 Alternatively, others argue against a uniform system of statutory interpretation because such a system could lead to a rigid system of stare decisis for interpreting statutes. 95 However, despite several states having adopted "methodological" and "formalistic" stare decisis, 96 it is unclear whether the method produces equitable results. 
III. PLATO'S SOUL
A. Welcome to Plato's Soul
Before an understanding of how the Platonic soul functions within the United States federal government, a brief outline of Plato's conception of the soul is required. Plato wrote that the soul (ψυχή) consists of three parts: the λογιστικόν (logical), the θυμοειδές (thymotic/spirit), and the ἐπιθυμητικόν (appetitive/ erotic). 100 Concurrently, a person has all three parts within herself or himself and acts justly if all the parts of the soul act as it is supposed to act. 101 If each part of the soul and each part of the city conduct their activities according to their "nature" or part of the soul, then all three parts of both city and individual will produce justice. 102 
B. Logos
Logos (λογιστικόν) 103 in the Platonic sense represents the part of the soul that loves knowledge and the search for knowledge. 104 The word in itself has a unique concept behind it: "λογιστικόν is one of Plato's many synonyms for the intellectual principle. Cf. 441 C, 571 C, 587 D, 605 B. It emphasizes the moral calculation of consequences, as opposed to blind passion." 105 This idea can be compared to the section in the Phaedrus where "Socrates compares the soul to a charioteer who controls two horses-one white and docile and the other black and intemperate. These three figures echo the division of the soul into reason, emotion, and appetite in Book IV of the Republic." 106 The charioteer is logos keeping control of the two horses.
C. Eros
Eros (ἐπιθυμητικός) 107 in the Platonic sense represents what Socrates says is "that with which it loves, hungers, thirsts, and feels the flutter and titillation of other desires, the irrational and appetitive -companion of various repletions [sic] and pleasures."
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D. Thumos
Thumos (θυμοειδές) 109 in the Platonic sense represents the "spirit" 110 of unifying with the logos but resisting the erotic part of the soul.
111 James Adam wrote in regards to this part of the Platonic soul that [t] here is also a third element or part of soul, that which we call the element of Spirit. It is distinct from the Appetitive element, with which, indeed, it frequently contends. Its function is to support the Rational part of the soul. In a man of noble character the spirited element is quiescent or the reverse in accordance with the commands of Reason. It must not however be identified with Reason; for it is present in children and the lower animals, whereas Reason is not. Homer also recognises that the two elements are distinct.
The analogy between the righteous city and the righteous soul is continued throughout this section. It should be noted however that the parallel is no longer quite exact. The difference between θυμοειδές and λογιστικόν in the soul is greater than that between auxiliaries and rulers in the State: for the λογιστικόν is not a select part of the θυμοειδές-as the rulers are of the soldiers-but something generically distinct from it. Otherwise the analogy holds (with the reservations mentioned on 435 A).
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Further, this key concept of thumos/spirit (θυμός) can be described as the:
distinctively Platonic sense of θυμός as the power of noble wrath, which, unless perverted by a bad education, is naturally the ally of the reason, though as mere angry passion it might seem to belong to the irrational part of the soul, and so, as Glaucon suggets, be akin to appetite, with which it is associated in the mortal soul of the Timaeus 69 D. In Laws 731 B-C. Plato tells us again that the soul cannot combat injustice without the capacity for righteous indignation. The Stoics affected to deprecate anger always, and the difference remained a theme of controversy between them and the Platonists. Cf. Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, ii. pp. 321 ff., Seneca, De ira, i. 9, and passim. Moralists are still divided on the point. Cf. Bagehot, Lord Brougham: "Another faculty of Brougham . . . is the faculty of easy anger. The supine placidity of civilization is not favorable to animosity [Bacon's word for θυμός]." Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, pp. 60 ff. and p. 62, seems to contradict Plato: "The supposed conflict between reason and passion is, as I hold, meaningless if it is taken to imply that the reason is a faculty separate from the emotions," etc. But this is only his metaphysics. On the practical ethical issue he is with Plato.
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E. The Platonic Soul Overall
Essentially, the Platonic soul (ψυχή) consists of three parts: the λογιστικόν (logical), the θυμοειδές (thymotic/spirit), and the ἐπιθυμητικόν (appetitive/erotic). Each part represents an integral part of human functioning, but there must be a balance among the parts for justice to exist. 125 Most recently, in Obergefell v. Hodges, 126 the public was split, with many in the United States appreciating the decision, and others seeing it as a violation of natural law. Either way, the Supreme Court took on a legislative role in deciding the case. As Professor Kenji Yoshino writes,
[w]hile Obergefell's most immediate effect was to legalize same-sex marriage across the land, its long-term impact could extend far beyond this context. To see this point, consider how much more narrowly the opinion could have been written. It could have invoked the equal protection and due process guarantees without specifying a formal level of review, and then observed that none of the state justifications survived even a deferential form of scrutiny. The Court had adopted this strategy in prior gay rights cases. 127 Illustrating the differences of originalist and evolutionary document theories of interpreting the Constitution, Andrew W. Schwartz writes discussing the Obergefell case:
The majority and dissenting opinions in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court's recent decision finding that same-sex marriage is a constitutional right, offer a lucid comparison of originalism with evolutionary document theories of interpretation. The majority point out that the institution of marriage "has evolved over time." Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, slip op. at 6 (U.S. June 26, 2015). Finding that the right to marry the person of one's choice, regardless of their gender, was compelled by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the majority described its task as interpreting a constitutional provision that sets forth broad principles rather than specific requirements. History and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do Over time, society may come to a consensus of whether the Court decided the case correctly, but it currently serves as an example of a Court decision stepping out of the bounds of the role of the judiciary and acting in a way to solve aspects that the legislature could not fix in terms of Constitutional guarantees. 129 Although ideally the Court would follow logos, the catch is that the members of the Court are not purely guided by logos-as to be expected-because all humans, according to Plato, have three aspects of the soul within themselves. not set its outer boundaries. That method respects our history and learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the present. The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all person to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution's central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed. Id. at 10-11 (citations omitted). In sharp contrast, Chief Justice Roberts and Associate Justice Alito, in their dissenting opinions, refused to recognize contemporary views of marriage, asserting that the notion of marriage as solely between a man and a woman is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' Id. at 14 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 2 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 701, 720-21 (1997)). Justice Scalia, in a separate dissent, relied on the public understanding of the meaning of marriage at the time the due process clause was ratified in 1868, which, he argued, universally confined marriage to a man and a woman. Id. at 4 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Constitution' is not a convenient slogan for transforming our very imperfect Constitution into something better than it is. While the effort to make the Constitution into something truly wonderful is an ever-present temptation, the problem with this high-sounding aspiration is obvious: there are lots of competing visions of liberal democratic constitutionalism, and the Constitution shouldn't be hijacked by any one of them. The aim of interpretation is to understand the constitutional commitments that have actually been made by the American people in history, not the commitments that one or another philosopher thinks they should have made. On this key point, I am closer to Justice Scalia than to Professor Ronald Dworkin. I part company when Scalia joins Alfarabi in assuming that the formal text contains the complete constitutional canon, thereby cutting himself off from the last seventy-five years of constitutional achievement.")
The idea of a three-part soul may be intended to understand the basic functions of an aspect of government, each member has an entire soul (ψυχή) governing their aspects of existence. This leads to more nuanced decisions, not only in the judiciary, but in all three branches of the government.
In terms of the judiciary, stepping outside of the bounds of the separate powers or the role in the soul of the polity can have good and bad outcomes. Justice from the charioteer comes from consistency, as many philosophers have defined justice. In this case, the logos is seen through the Supreme Court and judiciary, applying and interpreting the law.
B. Executive as Thumos
In this paper the executive 130 represents thumos. Thumos represents the spirit of the soul, as represented by the white horse in the Phaedrus. 131 The white horse is spirited but controlled with a sense of potential shame. 132 
Explaining Why the Executive is Not Logos
However, in Professor Covitz's formulation, the executive represents logos. As mentioned previously, Socrates states in the Republic that a person "watering and fostering the growth of the rational principle [logos] in his soul and the others the appetitive and the passionate [two representing eros]," and this person "is not by nature of a bad disposition but has fallen into evil communications," meaning this person has not become evil, but just in between the pull of logos and the pull of eros, but is otherwise unable to make a decision. 133 Socrates says this tension will resolve in "a compromise and turns over the government in his soul to the intermediate principle of ambition and high spirit and becomes a man haughty of soul and covetous of honor [meaning a turn to the thymotic part of the soul]" 134 This indicates that one will likely turn to politics while in the tension of logos and eros, and, in other words, has become thymotic. This is more akin to the President-rather than a member of the judiciary-who, in all likelihood, is in search of honors much like other politicians. This is not a negative aspect of the executive, necessarily, because if the executive of the country did not seek honor or maintain some "haughtiness," other politicians and world leaders would take advantage of us. She must be a decisive president, not merely logical. Yet logic-as well as eros-may and must exist within her, but she must, as President, have a prevailing thymotic element.
Cases and Examples Showing Why the Executive Represents Thumos
Here, the thumos manifests itself where a part of the Executive branch of government-such as the EPA-would interpret a statute from the legislature and implement it. This occurs through the rules laid out by the Supreme Court and the judiciary as seen in the Chevron case.
CONCLUSION
To reiterate, this paper demonstrates that interpretation of the problems and the eventual purpose of the United States government, while simultaneously explaining its continued existence, requires analysis of the three-part structure of the United States federal government as outlined in the Constitution, and subsequently interpreted by all three parts of the government through the lens of the Platonic paradigm of logos, thumos, and eros as explained in Plato's dialogues. The major premise of the paper is Plato's three-part soul. The minor premise is the three-part structure of the United States government. The syllogism is the analysis which shows how each part of the Platonic soul represents itself in three parts: judiciary for logos, executive for thumos, and legislature for eros.
Overall, this Platonic analysis of the Constitution's structure and function could add to the dialogue of constitutional analysis. Indeed, there are arguments for originalist, textualist, and evolving constitutional doctrine, but there seems to be a basis for a Platonic interpretation of the Constitution.
In line with a balanced soul of the polity and a balanced government, it would seem that each part of government would not reach into another's duties. 142 As fate would have it, each person in the Platonic paradigm has the three parts of the Platonic soul. Although an individual may act in one part of the federal government, each person has all three parts. Thus, it is to be expected that different parts of the soul would manifest in a different part of the federal government.
